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ALBERTJ.HETTINGER JR.
PARTNER, LAZARD FRERESAND COMPANY
THE National Bureau affords its directors thePrivikge of submittinga memorandum of dissent or reservation"to a manuscriptaccepted for publication. What I am submittingare neither dissentsnor reservations but a questioning conlrnent.Ihave read themanuscript twice,in original draft and irs fun! galley proof. Icaeer]y await themore pleasant reading afforded by a published volume,where tab!esappear in context and charts, by their presence, removethat need for faith,defined by St. Paul as "the substance of things hopedfor, the evidenceof things not seen.'This volume, if my judmentis sound. is one of thetruly great ones published by the National Bureau.Its breadth ofscope, its penetrating use of anaivtical toolsto set forthdissect, and ina sense reconstitute, as it might have been, nearlya century of themonetary history of the United States, has createda finished product thatI w11 reread more than once withenjoyment coupled with aCOnviCtofl that time so spent is profitably employed. Myquestioning is not of the logic
of a brilliant presentation, but ofan underlying assumption Mvbrief
comments will be based largely upon theperiod 1929-31 The authors
state, in their summation of the period, "Thereis one senseandso far
as we can see, only one--in which a casecan be made for the proposition
that the monetary decline wasa consequence of the economicdecline.
That sense is not relevant toour main task of seeking to understand
economic relations, sinceit involves relying priniarilvon psrchoioeical
and political factors" (p. 691
We are inevitably, in varvinCdegrees, influenced byour background
and environment. Mine compelsme to place niuch ereater weight upon
these 'psychological and politicalfactors" than the authors would be
willing to concede.I am a businessman byprofession, an amateur
economist by avocation. Mv doctor'sdeereein economics regrettably
lies nearly halfa century in the past; my fewyears of university teach-
ingare almostasremotecompetitivebusiness,acombinationof
industry arid finance hasbeen my profession since 1926. Tome. btisini'ss
is simply decisionmaking arid calculated risk takin. Decisionsare not
ahvass easy, and the risktakingisreal;Isurvive by virtue of myDIRECTORS COMMENT
cc,rrlpetitors' mistakesif they did not makeaboutas many as I do,
would be an ex-businessnian. It has been burned in upon me that mon-
etarv policy, in final analysis, acts on menwhose conduct is not pre-
dictable;it neither operates in vacuum nor in a world in which all
other factors can be taken as constant.
The difficulty of predicting the impact of economic tricasures was
faced in the Third Report of the British Council on Prices, Productivit','
and Incomes, generally assumed to have been written by Sir Dennis
Robertson.' After some 72 sections attempting to analyze the situation
and weigh the probabilities, there follows: 'But no precise judgment of
the balance of all these factors is possible; economic restraints and in-
centives operate on men's minds where it is not possible to forecast their
precise effects; they operate also in circumstances which are constantly
changing." And Lord Keynes, here a "decision maker," told the 1931
annual meeting of the invesnent trust of which he was chairman: "I
have reluctantly reached the conclusion that nothing is more suicidal than
a rational investment policy in an irrational world" (quoted from memory,
without verification of exact phraseology). He also states in his Treatise
on Money: "To diagnose the position precisely at every stage and to
achieve this exact balance may sometimes be. however. beyond the wits
of man."2 One final example: Sir Henry Clay's biography oI Lord Nor-
man3 tells of the head of the Bank of England. physically exhausted but
feeling that the international monetary system was temporarily under
control, yielding to doctors' orders and taking a brief cruise or, the
Mediterraneanto be greeted when the ship put into port with the
news that Britain had gone off gold!
The authors of this volume in discussing the silver situation (1893-97)
recognize the importance of psychological and political factors when they
say. "the entire silver episode is a fascinating example of how important
what people think about money can sometimes be. The fear that silver
would produce an inflation sufficient to force the United States off the
gold standard made it necessary to have a severe deflation in order to
slav on the gold standard" (p. 133).
Ihave ciften wished that Professor 'I'aussig had included, in the
economic text I studied, a chapter on the force of momentum. Value, I
was taught, was the determining long-nmfactor, and deviations in price
from value, short term and self-correcting.Ilearned the force of a
spiraling downward momentum, feeding on emotional fear, during the
1929-33 period, and experienced a replay during the confidence crisis
and stock market debacle of the spring of 1962. A nonstatistical view
London, tIM. Stationery Office, July 1959,p. 25, paragraph 73.
New York, Harcourt, Erace, 1930, Vol. I,p. 255.




of the psychologyof the !92933 period waspresented ina paper
delivered by J. M. Barker (university teacher, banker, and senior official
of Src,Roebuck & Co.) before a rnidwestei-n conferenceof bane
in 1936, fromwhich I quote:
Whenevcr you have a group of people thinking the same thing at thesame
time you have oneof the hardest emotional causes in the worldtø control.
e morepeople that are thinking the same thing the more surelyyou are at
the mercy of unreasoning, emotional mob psychology as a cause, with some-
times dire economiceffects..If You consider the universalityof the
speculative mania of the later days of the last boom, you will see how corn.
pletely the people of thk COtilitil', to say nothing of the world, s%ere under the
in8uence of the mob psychology of unreasoning, emotional cupidity, When
the break came, cupidityturn"d into unreasoning, emotional,universal fear.
in every city of this country, business men, hard hit or already wiped out
in the stock marketirsthe earlier part of the crash, were still watching the
quotations every day tosee how things were going. They saw the market
dropping, dropping, dropping. Is there any doubt they made their decisions
from day to day under the influence of the emotional backgrounds formed
by their observations of the falling seCurity pri-cs?
The authors arehighlycriticalof Federal Reserve policies. The
continuing conflicts within thes stern are convincingly documented:
Board, Open Market Committee, and individual Reserve Banksthey
call to mind the line from ottc of Ibsen's plays that fins: "When the
devil decided that nothing be accomplished, he appointed the first com-
mittee." The authors' diagnosis: "The bull market brought the objective
of promoting business activity into conflict with the desire to restrain stock
market speculation. The conflict was re5o!vedin1928 aid1929
by adoption of a monetary policy, not restrictive enough to halt the bull
market yet too restrictive to foster vigorous business expansion" (pp. 297-
298). Their conclusion that "the Board should not have made itself
an 'arbiter of security speculation or values' and should have paid no
direct attention to the stock market boom" (p. 291) is one I am rsot sure
I can accept. With holding company superimposed on holding company,
call loans for "others" mounting by the billion, and momentum feeding
on itself, the monetary ease that would have "fostered vigorous expan-
sion" might well have cumulated economic maladjustments whose cor-
rection was merely postponed. As it was, when the break came. "as in
pre-Federal Reserve times. j. P. Morgan and Company assumed leader-
ship of an effort to restore art orderly market by organizing a pool of
funds"--.-yet "by the second week after the crash the phase of organized
support of the market was over" (p. 305). This was a different kind of
depression.
With possiblyunjustifiable oversimplificationindescription on my
part, the basic weapon in the authors' arsenal may be termed their
l'7
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concept of high-powered money. Their treatment of its r()!C
15COnsiStCnt and briiliaiitiv analytical in depth. One point onlydisturbs me There
is no question as to the mathematical demonstration.If
nionev could be increased by tire Federal Reserve withoutthat very
move setting other forces in motion. unpredictal,le bothas to source
and intensity.I would have rio reservations.I lack competenceto pass
judgment. This is not a controlled experiment, withhigh.powered hOney
increased, and all other factors remainingconstant.Depositors were
watching their banks. "One of thereasons New York City bankswere said to be reluctant to borrow from the ReserveBank was the fear
that Europeans would interpret borrowingas an indkation of weakne"
(p. 317). "The aversion to borrowing by banks.....as stillgreater
at a time when depositors were fearful of the safetyof every bank and
were scrutinizing balance sheets with greatcare to see which banks
were likely to be next to go" (p.3 18). To borrowfrom the RFCwas
the kiss of death: "the inclusion ofa bank's nanse on the hit wasCOrr-PCtIy interpreted as a simi of weakness, and hencefrequently led toruns on
the bank" (p. 325). It is difficult todayto rcca!i 'the dominant impor-
tance then attached to the preservation ofthe gold standard and the
greater significance attached to external thanto internal stability.b', both the System and thecommunity at large" (p. 363).Summarizing, in the words of Lord Keynes:"If we are dealing witha closed system.
so that there is only the condition of internalequilibrium to fulfil!, an
appropriate banking policy is alwayscapable of preventingany serious disturbance to thestatus quoIrom developing at all...But when thcondition of external equilibriummust also be fulfilled, then there
willbe no banking policy capableof avoiding disturbancetothe internal system."1 A parallelreading of Professor Chandler'sbiography of Benjamin Strong" andthat of Lord Norman by SirHenry Clay should leave no doubt thatwe were dealing with no closedsystem: the extent of the erosion ofnewly created high-poweredmoney would be one
measure of the "disturbance to theinternal system'' that I(with what justification I amnot capable of answering) wouldnot treat lihtl
The authors ask. "Whywas monetary policy so inept?" andanswer. "We trust that, inlight of thc precedingsections of this chapter, the adjective used...to characterize monetary policyduring the critical period from 1929to 1933 strikes our readers,as it does us, as a plain description of the factThe monetars'system collapsed. hut it clearly need not have doneso"(p. 407). Themoneta' policy certainly was unsuccessful and probablythe characterj7atiofl of"inept" isjustified. With respect to thefinal statement thattue collapse of the monetary
'A Teatjon Money. Vol. 1. p 349
'Lester V. Chandler,Benjamin Strong. Washington,D.C, Brooking,, 1958
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system was unnecessitry,thisIcannot feel has been proved. Tonie
each move inthe high-powered-money arsenal involvesa calculatd
risk.If its impact on niens minds is favorable, l)0SSIbLV ev'ifitis
neutral, the arithmeticalresults postulated by the authorsfollow as
night after day.1 merely cite at tltjpoint the earlier quotationfrom
the report of theBritish Council on Prices, Productivity andincomes.
If those moves weredeemed inflationary and "unsound.'the results
could have been other than those desired. In that day a citizen fearing
devaluation could choose gold rather than paper, and the international
flow of gold, seekingsafety, was as unpredtctable as that ofa gun loose on
a battleshippitching in heavy seas. The authors may well be right; they
are outstanding monetai'veconomists--but I would prefer theterms
'possibly" or conceivably "probably" rather than "clearly" need not
have happened.
If ms recollectioniscorrect, the most striking illustrationof the
potentialities of high-powered money are those cited in connection with
the five-month period ended January 1932, in which deposits fell by
$5,727 million. "The provision of $400 million of additional high-
powered money to meet the currency drain without a decline in bank
reserves could have prevented a decline of nearly $6 billion in deposits"
p. 346Mathematically this was possible. Reviewing the economy in
the United States at that time, and the situation in both Britain arid
Central EuropeI cannot believe that what in theory "could" have
happened. in actuality "would" have happened.
There is a well-documented analysis of what would have happened
had one billion dollars of additional hieh-powered money beer, introduced
into the economy during any one of three strategic periods in the great
depression(I) Januar' 1930 to end of October 1930, (2) January
1931 to end of August 1931, and (3September 1931 to end of January
1932. Were a Lloyds to underwrite the assumed potential turning of
the tide,I could rest more easily. Ifit be permitted to lapse into the
terminology of the market place, there is a vast difference between gross
income and net income. This would be determined by the reaction on
men's minds, not only in this country, but in every monetary center of
the world. Had it been favorable, the authors' assumptions are tenable;
had it, for instance, been deemed an inflationary threat to the gold
standard, the "cost" (in erosion of those high-powered dollars) could
have reduced the "net" to such an extent as would have precluded the
results confidently anticipated by the authors Again. I don't know; I
am merely questioning.
In Kerrville, Texas, the "Bank of the Charles E. Schreiner Estate" is
run by Louis Schreiner, aged aoiit 90, arid was founded by his father,
old Captain Sclueiner, as lieis termed in those parts. The old Captain
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laid down the rule: 'The timeto call your loan is beforeyou naijr" and in almost a century, good timesand bad that bank has°'s'er caJlJ a loan. High-powered money, intelligentlyadministered by areulatory body, can, as the authors pointout, accomplish much. Itcannot ac- complish the impossibkthereseems to me an analogy inLord Key3' rueful remark: "Nothingis more suicidal than a rationalinvestment policy in an irrational world." Iwould have more hopeof its keeping us out of trouble than inits ability to turnan emotional tidalwa after we got into trouble.
I claim no validity formy "questioning comment."Duringroy uni- versity days I would have placedlittle emphasisupon the Psychological and political factors:a long life in business has changed
my view5. The story is told that Bismarck in council,after his staff hadscoffed at cer- tain factors which theytermed imponderable,reached his decision: "Gentlemen, the Imponderableshave it." I haveno idea whether his decision was correct, andsimilarly I haveno idea whether theweight I attach to imponderableshas validity. Mycomments are set forth with humility, because r have madetoo many mistakes to dootherwise Over all, my admiration forA Monetary Historyof the UnitedStates, 1867-1960 is unrestrained
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